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 2 
The Global Consortium for H5N8 and Related Influenza Viruses*† 3 
Abstract 4 
Avian influenza viruses affect both poultry production and public health. A subtype H5N8 (clade 5 
2.3.4.4) virus, following an outbreak in poultry in South Korea in 2013/2014, rapidly spread worldwide 6 
in 2014/2015. Our analysis of H5N8 viral sequences, epidemiological investigations, waterfowl 7 
migration, and poultry trade showed that long-distance migratory birds can play a major role in the 8 
global spread of avian influenza viruses. Further, we found that the haemagglutinin of clade 2.3.4.4 9 
virus was remarkably promiscuous, creating reassortants with multiple neuraminidase subtypes. 10 
Improving our understanding of the circumpolar circulation of avian influenza viruses in migratory 11 
waterfowl will help to provide early warning of threats from avian influenza to poultry, and potentially 12 
human, health.  13 
 14 
One Sentence Summary 15 
Interdisciplinary analysis showed a major role for long-distance migratory birds in the global spread of 16 
avian influenza virus H5N8 via (sub)arctic breeding areas.  17 
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In 2014, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of the subtype H5N8 caused disease 18 
outbreaks in poultry in Asia, Europe and North America (1–3). Avian influenza viruses are a threat 19 
both to global poultry production and to public health; they have the potential to cause severe disease 20 
in people, and to adapt to transmit efficiently in human populations (4). This was the first time since 21 
2005 that a single subtype of HPAIV had spread over such a large geographical area, and that a 22 
Eurasian HPAI virus had spread to North America. The rapid global spread of HPAI H5N8 virus 23 
outbreaks raised the question by which routes the virus had been transmitted. 24 
 25 
The segment encoding for the haemagglutinin (HA) surface protein of the HPAI H5N8 viruses is a 26 
descendant of the HPAI H5N1 virus (A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996), first detected in China in 1996 (5). 27 
Since then, HPAI H5N1 viruses have become endemic in poultry populations in several countries. 28 
The H5 viruses have developed new characteristics by mutation and by reassortment with other avian 29 
influenza (AI) viruses, both in poultry and wild birds. In 2005-2006, HPAI H5N1 spread from Asia to 30 
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa during the course of a few months. While virus spread 31 
traditionally had been attributed to transport of infected poultry, infected poultry products, or HPAI-32 
virus-contaminated materials, several observations in the 2005-2006 epidemic suggested that wild 33 
birds also might have carried the virus to previously unaffected areas (6). 34 
 35 
A HPAI H5N8 virus with genes from viruses of the influenza A (H5N1) A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 36 
lineage was first detected in birds at live bird markets in China in 2010 (1). This HPAI H5N8 virus was 37 
a reassortant virus with the HA gene segment from HPAI H5N1 virus and other gene segments from 38 
multiple other AI viruses circulating in eastern China (1), and is now categorized as HPAI H5 virus 39 
clade 2.3.4.4 (7). This clade is unusually promiscuous and has been found in combination with six 40 
different neuraminidase (NA) segments, and multiple H5Nx viruses may be circulating at the same 41 
time and in the same region (8, 9). The propensity of HPAI H5 virus clade 2.3.4.4 to form novel 42 
subtypes capable of rapid, global spread is a major concern. 43 
 44 
HPAI H5N8 virus caused a large avian influenza outbreak in poultry in South Korea in the winter of 45 
2013/2014, and subsequently spread to Japan, North America, and Europe, causing outbreaks there 46 
between autumn 2014 and spring 2015 (Table S1). However, it is not clear by which routes HPAI 47 
H5N8 virus spread so rapidly around the world. Although there have been reports on parts of these 48 
outbreaks (1, 2, 10) and speculation on possible routes of transmission (3), no comprehensive global 49 
analysis has yet been performed. 50 
 51 
The goal of this study was to analyse the available genetic, epidemiological and ornithological data for 52 
evidence of the relative contributions from poultry trade and from wild bird movements (3, 6) for the 53 
global spread of clade 2.3.4.4 during 2014-2015. For this purpose, we performed phylogeographic 54 
analysis of HPAI H5N8 viruses detected in wild birds and poultry from this global outbreak. In 55 
addition, we analysed migration patterns of wild birds found infected with HPAI H5N8 virus, 56 
epidemiological investigations of HPAI H5N8 virus outbreaks, and poultry trade records from 57 
countries where HPAI H5N8 virus was reported (11).  58 
 59 
Initial phylogenetic analysis was performed using HA sequences from HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses 60 
of poultry and wild birds from around the world between 2004 and 2015, including subtypes H5N1, 61 
H5N2, H5N3, H5N5, H5N6 and H5N8. From 2004 to 2012, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were circulating 62 
predominantly in Eastern Asia (China) with some transmission to South Eastern Asia (Figures 1 and 63 
S1). During this period, transmission involving domestic anseriforms (ducks and geese) appears to 64 
dominate, although some contribution from domestic galliforms (chickens and turkeys) and short-65 
distance migratory anseriforms (e.g. mallard ducks) is also evident (Figure 1). Unlike H5 segments 66 
from other clades, which are mostly found as H5N1, the HPAI H5 segment of the clade 2.3.4.4 67 
viruses reassort frequently, acquiring NA segments from co-circulating low pathogenic avian influenza 68 
(LPAI) subtypes, including N5 (from 2006-2010), N2 (from 2008-2012), and N8 (from 2010), and more 69 
recently N6 (from 2013) (8). To indicate the host species and regions in which the reassortments are 70 
thought to have occurred, a reassortment measure was calculated using the number of branches in 71 
the posterior set of phylogenetic trees for which the NA-subtype changed whilst the host species and 72 
region traits remained the same (normalized by branch lengths). This measure suggests that most of 73 
the observed reassortants were generated in domestic anseriforms (Figure S2), and particularly 74 
domestic anseriforms in Eastern Asia (China) within the time period 2004-2012 (Figure S3). 75 
 76 
The time to the most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) for the HA segment of all clade 2.3.4.4 HPAI 77 
H5N8 sequences was estimated as June 2010 (95% highest posterior density (HPD): Jan-Oct 2010); 78 
the TMRCA for the corresponding NA segments was similar (Sep 2010, 95% HPD: Apr-Dec 2010). 79 
Clade 2.3.4.4 HA H5N8 sequences were found in two subclades (Figure 1). The smaller and earlier 80 
subclade (a in Figure 1) contained the first sequenced 2.3.4.4 HPAI H5N8 virus 81 
(A/Duck/Jiangsu/k1203/2010[H5N8]). The larger and more recent subclade (b in Figure 1) contained 82 
sequences from outbreaks in South Korea and other countries included in this study, and which 83 
caused multiple HPAI outbreaks in 2014 and 2015 globally. The TMRCA of subclade b was 84 
September 2013 for both HA (95% HPD: Jul-Nov 2013) and NA (95% HPD: May-Nov 2013). 85 
Consistent with earlier findings (1, 10), the phylogeny indicates that HPAI H5N8 was introduced into 86 
South Korea by long-distance migrant anseriforms that acquired it from the pool of HPAI H5 viruses 87 
circulating in domestic anseriforms in Eastern Asia (China), although we formally cannot exclude the 88 
possibility that HPAI H5 viruses were circulating in unsampled locations (Figure 1). 89 
 90 
Distinct, well-supported clades were identified in South Korea, likely originating in the transmission of 91 
HPAI H5N8 viruses from long-distance migrants to other wild and domestic birds (10). One clade (c in 92 
Figure 1) was ancestral to the European outbreak and another (d in Figure 1) was ancestral to the 93 
North American outbreak. Again, we cannot exclude the possibility that viruses from these subclades 94 
were present in unsampled locations. 95 
 96 
More detailed phylogenetic analyses, using only clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 HA sequences with location 97 
coordinates, showed that the virus spread along two main long-distance migration routes: one from 98 
the east Asia coast/Korean peninsula, north to the Arctic coast of the Eurasian continent, then west to 99 
Europe; and the other north from the Korean peninsula, then east across the Bering Strait, and south 100 
along the north-west coast of the North American continent to Canada and the USA (Figure 2 and 101 
Movie S1). The reconstruction did not indicate any spread between Europe and North America. The 102 
TMRCA for European HA segments was August 2014 (95% HPD: Jul-Oct 2014), and September-103 
October 2014 (95% HPD: Aug-Nov 2014) for the North American HA segments (Table S2a-b). Similar 104 
results were found from analysis of the NA segments (Table S2c-d). There were also four separate 105 
introductions into Japan, the first estimated around February 2014 (ancestral date of single virus 106 
A/Chicken/Kumamoto/1-7/2014), and then three more, all with TMRCAs in October-November 2014. 107 
The sequences from one of the Japanese introductions were most closely related to sequences from 108 
Taiwan, and those from another to the Russian (A/wigeon/Sakha/1/2014) and European sequences. 109 
 110 
The phylogenetic data were also used to infer the ancestral host categories of the most recent 111 
common ancestor of the European and North American outbreak sequences, thus providing evidence 112 
for which host type had introduced the viruses into those areas (Figures 3, S4 and S5, Table S2). 113 
The most likely ancestral host category for the North American outbreak for both HA and NA 114 
segments was long-distance migrants (HA: 66% and NA: 84%). A similar result was obtained for 115 
Europe (HA: 66% and NA: 70%). 116 
 117 
Several wild bird species with known HPAI H5N8 sequences were long-distance migrants at different 118 
stages of their migratory cycle depending on time and place found (Table S3): five of the nine species 119 
found in South Korea in winter 2013/2014 were long-distance migrants at their wintering sites or on 120 
spring migration. Both in North America and Europe, two of the four species found in  winter 121 
2014/2015 were long-distance migrants at their wintering sites or on autumn migration (11)(Tables S4 122 
and S5, Figure S6). 123 
 124 
The April 2014 HPAI H5N8 virus outbreak in Japan had different characteristics to the later outbreaks 125 
in North America and Europe. The Japan outbreak was the only one that was contemporaneous with 126 
the outbreak in South Korea and no wild birds were found positive for HPAI H5N8 virus in Japan 127 
during that outbreak. 128 
 129 
Qualitative analysis of data from outbreak investigations on affected poultry farms in North America, 130 
Europe and Japan (11) (Table S6) showed that the likelihood of virus introduction via contaminated 131 
water, feed and poultry  was negligible (Germany). Furthermore, no links between the outbreaks in 132 
one country and those in other countries could be attributed to personnel contacts or trade of live 133 
animals, feed, or products of animal origin (Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Hungary). 134 
Many affected poultry farms were located in areas where wild waterfowl are abundant (Germany, The 135 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada). Direct contact with infected wild birds (USA) or indirect 136 
contact with materials (e.g., bedding material, boots, wheels of vehicles) contaminated with wild bird 137 
faeces was considered the most likely route of introduction into poultry holdings (USA, Germany, The 138 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy). In some outbreaks, the source of infection was unknown or 139 
inconclusive (Japan, Hungary). 140 
 141 
We reviewed FAO data (12) for 2011 to 2013 on export and import of live domestic ducks and 142 
chickens of affected countries to estimate the risk of spread of HPAI virus from South Korea to other 143 
countries via international poultry trade (Table S7). Data on the export of live poultry from North 144 
Korea and Mongolia, also in East Asia, were not available from FAO. Although all countries (Japan, 145 
Canada, USA, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy, Hungary) where HPAI H5N8 virus 146 
emerged between November 2014 and February 2015 imported live chickens and live domestic 147 
ducks in 2013, South Korea reported the export of a low number of live chickens and no export of live 148 
domestic ducks, although unreported cross-border trade cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, based on 149 
these data, it seems unlikely that international trade in live poultry played a major role in the long-150 
distance spread of South Korean clade HPAI H5N8 virus during the winter of 2014/2015. 151 
 152 
Our analysis, using four different sources of data, indicates that the main routes of large-scale 153 
geographical spread of HPAI H5N8 virus were most probably via long-distance flights of infected 154 
migratory wild birds, first in spring 2014 from South Korea or other unsampled locations in the region 155 
to northern breeding grounds, and then in autumn 2014 from these breeding grounds along migration 156 
routes to wintering sites in North America and Europe. 157 
 158 
Recognition of a likely role of wild birds in the spread of HPAI reinforces the need to improve 159 
biosecurity on poultry farms and to exclude wild birds from the immediate vicinity of poultry farms. 160 
Culling wild birds, draining or disinfecting wetlands would not be effective because these viruses 161 
disseminate on rapid time scales over very large distances, making reactive interventions of this kind 162 
impractical and ineffective, as well as contravening commitments made by signatory countries to the 163 
Convention on Migratory Species and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. 164 
 165 
The potential role of wild birds in the circumpolar circulation of influenza viruses does point to the 166 
need to increase our knowledge about the connectedness at the vast circumpolar (sub)arctic breeding 167 
areas between migratory waterfowl populations originating from different wintering areas. Surveillance 168 
of waterfowl at the crossroads of migratory flyways to wintering areas in Europe, Asia, and North 169 
America would inform epidemiological risk analysis and provide early warning of specific HPAI threats 170 
to poultry, and potentially human, health. 171 
 172 
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 275 
Figure 1. Maximum clade credibility (MCC) time scaled phylogenetic tree of multi-subtype HA 276 
sequences colored by subtype, region and host-type traits. The clades marked a and b contain H5N8 277 
sequences, and c and d contain sequences from Europe and North America, respectively. The 278 
displayed MCC tree was obtained from a posterior set of trees inferred using BEAST (13)  with the 279 
SRD06 nucleotide substitution model, uncorrelated relaxed clock model and constant population size 280 
tree prior. The branches are colored according to the most probable ancestral trait, and ancestral 281 
traits were inferred by a symmetric (subtype and region) or asymmetric discrete trait model (host-type) 282 
upon the posterior tree set (14).  Host-types are Dom-Ans (red): domestic anseriform birds, Dom-Gal 283 
(green): domestic galliform birds, Wild-Long (blue): long-distance migratory wild birds, Wild-Short 284 
(purple): short-distance migratory wild birds. 285 
 286 
  287 
 288 
Figure 2. Reconstruction of the transmission route using phylogenetic data only from H5N8 HA 289 
sequences. At each time slice, the host-type and location coordinates on the branches of the posterior 290 
set of phylogenetic trees are inferred and plotted as a cloud of points. The host-type was inferred by 291 
discrete trait model (as Figure 1) (14) , and the continuous location coordinates were inferred using a 292 
homogeneous Brownian motion diffusion model (15). The map projection used is the azimuthal 293 
equidistant projection, centred on the North Pole, which is marked with a + sign. In this projection, all 294 
points on the map are at proportionately correct distances and at the correct direction from the North 295 
pole. Color key as for Fig. 1; see also Movie 1. 296 
 297 
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 299 
Figure 3. Posterior distributions of time to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) of HA sequences 300 
from Europe and North America with H5N8 subtype only, including Host type reconstructions, based 301 
upon a posterior set of phylogenetic trees generated as in Fig 1. Color key as for Fig. 1. 302 
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